Tradable White Certificates (TWC) schemes, also labelled Energy-Efficiency Certificates schemes, were recently implemented in Great Britain, Italy and France. Energy suppliers have to fund a given quantity of energy efficiency measures, or to buy so-called "white certificates" from other suppliers who exceed their target. We develop a partial equilibrium model to compare TWC schemes to other policy instruments for energy efficiency, i.e., energy taxes, subsidies on energy-saving goods and regulations fixing a minimum level of energy-efficiency. The model features an endogenous level of energy service and we analyse the influence of the substitutability between energy and energy-saving goods to produce the energy service, as well as the influence of the elasticity of demand for the energy service. We show that if the level of energy service consumption is fixed, a TWC scheme is as efficient as an energy tax, but that it is much less otherwise because it does not provide the optimal incentive to reduce the consumption of energy service. This inefficiency is worsened if energy suppliers' targets are fixed rather than proportional to the suppliers' current output. On the other hand, compared to taxes, a TWC scheme allows reaching a given level of energy savings with a lower increase in the consumers' energy price, which may ease its implementation.
Introduction
Energy efficiency and energy savings, which had somewhat dropped from the political agenda following the counter-oil shock of the late 1980's, have recently raised more attention, especially due to climate change and security of supply concerns. Meanwhile, the end of state monopolies in the electricity and gas sectors has led to design new policy instruments to save energy.
In particular, energy efficiency certificates, dubbed Tradable White Certificates (TWC), were recently implemented in Great Britain (UK Ofgem, 2005; Sykes, 2005) , Italy (Pagliano et al., 2003; Pavan, 2005) and France (Moisan, 2004; Dupuis, 2007) . Setting aside various differences among these systems, they may be schematically described as follows. Energy suppliers have to generate a given quantity of energy savings, or, if they are short of their target, to buy certificates from other suppliers. Vice versa, suppliers who have funded more measures than their target are allowed to sell such white certificates to those who are short of their target. In general, in order to be taken into account, energy savings have to take place in energy consumers' dwellings or plants, not in energy suppliers' facilities. In practice, suppliers typically fund energy savings in their own customers' dwellings, or contract with retailers who increase their sales of energyefficient goods in exchange for a funding from the energy supplier.
The peer-reviewed literature on TWC schemes is increasing but still scarce. Langniss and Praetorius (2006) as well as Mundaca (2007) discuss the transaction costs associated with the generation of TWC and their implication for TWC markets, an issue that we do not address here. Bertoldi and Huld (2006) discuss some implementation issues as well as the interaction of TWC schemes with other trading systems, a question that we do not address either. Vine and Hamrin (2008) present the experience to date with TWC schemes and outline potential opportunities in the United States. Farinelli et al. (2005) , Mundaca (2008) and Oikonomou et al. (2007) quantify the potential for a TWC scheme, in Europe for the first two papers and in the Netherlands for the latter. To date, an analysis of the economic mechanisms at stake when implementing a TWC scheme and of its relative efficiency compared to other policy instruments seems to be lacking.
In the present paper, we compare two types of TWC schemes to other policy instruments for energy efficiency, i.e., taxes, subsidies and regulations. On this purpose, we develop a simple partial equilibrium model representing the markets for four commodities: energy, energy-saving goods or services, a composite good and TWCs. This paper builds on a working paper by Quirion (2006) but enhances it by (i) using more general functional forms (CES instead of Cobb-3 of 29 Douglas) thereby allowing a sensitivity analysis of the elasticities; (ii) allowing for an endogenous level of energy service; (iii) assessing another policy instrument (the subsidy).
Although this simple model cannot by far address all the issues raised when choosing between TWC schemes and other policy instruments, it is able to shed a first light on their economic efficiency and on their contrasted distributional consequences.
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section we present some background information on TWC schemes in practice. The first model and the policy instruments are presented in section 2 and numerical results in section 3. These results are discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 lists the model's variables and parameters and Appendix 2 provides the method used to compare the national targets.
Tradable white certificates in practice
What is generally called a TWC is the commodity potentially traded between suppliers 1 . A TWC scheme can then formally be understood as an obligation to save a given quantity of energy coupled with a flexibility mechanism, actually the market for TWCs. Although this instrument targets potentially every final consumption sector (including industry or transports), it focuses in practice on existing buildings (mainly residential but commercial as well), considered as the greatest potential for cost-efficient energy savings.
Although the existing schemes in the UK, Italy and France largely conform to this definition, there are some differences among them, for example the obligation to achieve half of the target in poor households in the UK.
In the UK, the first such system, labelled the "Energy Efficiency Commitment" (EEC1), required (Ellerman and Montero, 2002) , emitters used the banking provision to ease the transition between the first and the second (more ambitious)
4 of 29 commitment period. Twelve suppliers groups were set a target under the EEC. Among them, two did not meet their target, generating a shortfall of nearly 1 TWh. Since these companies had ceased energy trading, no penalty was imposed on them because it would have served no practical purpose.
To tackle "fuel poverty", at least half of the target had to be achieved in the "Priority group", defined as those households receiving certain-income related benefits and tax credits. This requirement was fulfilled during EEC1. The last available information indicates that one quarter before the end of the EEC2, the target had already been overachieved by 26%, including the carry-over from EEC1 (UK Ofgem, 2008) . Although committed suppliers were allowed to trade commitments or energy efficiency activities, such trades occurred neither in the first nor in the second period.
Note that for the third period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) ) the government replaced the EEC by the CERT (carbon emission reduction target) with the following characteristics: a target expressed in CO 2 equivalent rather than in energy; a roughly doubled quantitative objective (154 Mt CO 2 ); a larger scope including micro-generation and biomass heating; and increased trading opportunities (UK Ofgem, 2008) .
In France, the three-year scheme started in July 2006 and the target is 54 TWh, also cumulated and discounted over the lifetime of the equipments funded. The latest available data show that 14
TWh have already been achieved, most of them (95%) in the residential sector. The actor's strategies are still not well described, but we know that some agents have already banked some certificates.
In Italy, the five-year scheme started 24% and the average market price has decreased (-57% for electricity titles and -11% for gas titles).
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In Table 1 we compare the targets in the three existing TWC schemes by translating them in a standardised unit, which leads to the following results (see Appendix 2 for calculation steps and hypotheses). As is apparent from table 1, these targets amount to roughly 1 to 2% of final national energy consumption. This simple partial equilibrium model features four agents (box 1): energy consumers (who may be firms or households) buy energy (labelled e) and energy-saving goods or services (labelled g for "green") to generate a certain level of energy service ES (figure 2) 3 . ES is "produced" by consumers, by combining e and g in a CES function, with an elasticity of substitution b σ .
Consumers choose the combination of e and g that minimises their cost subject to the constraint that energy service reaches a level ES.
Consumers also buy a composite good labelled c, which is combined with ES in a CES function, with an elasticity of substitution a σ , to create utility. Consumers choose the combination of ES and c that minimises their cost subject to the constraint that utility reaches an exogenous level 7 of 29 U . Throughout the paper we take a b σ σ < to represent the fact that e and g are closer substitutes to one another than to c.
Figure 2. Consumer demand system
Firms maximise their profit under perfect competition and produce under linearly decreasing returns. Our model represents the short term, i.e. the productive capital is fixed, hence the assumption of decreasing returns. We assume that public authorities do not intervene in price setting, and especially that the energy market is fully liberalised. Without loss of generality, we normalise the number of firms and consumers to one in order to simplify the notations, but we assume that the real number is large enough for them to be price-takers on all markets.
Box 1. Model equations in business-as-usual
Formally we have two optimisation programs, both minimising consumer cost under a quantity constraint:
Min P e P g B s t ES e g
First-order conditions lead to good demands:
where P u (resp. P ES ) is the shadow price of program A (resp. B), respectively defined by the following equations: 
The first order condition leads to the supply function:
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The cost incurred by consumers to get a given utility from consumption U is:
And the total cost is
Calibration of the parameters
Calibration is done in order to represent roughly the French residential sector. We then numerically solve the eight supply and demand equations (4-8), (12), (14) and (16), which provide the four quantities c, e, g and ES.
To compute the equilibrium with an energy saving policy, we let e exogenous and modify some of the above equations as described in sections 2.3 to 2.8 below. We are thus able to compare the outcome of these policy instruments for a given level of energy saving. We implicitly assume 10 of 29 that an excessive energy use entails external costs (air pollution, climate change, threats on supply security…), justifying an energy-saving policy, but we do not model this part of the issue.
In other words, we set a cost-efficiency framework, not a cost-benefit one.
White certificates with a target as a percentage of energy sold (WC % )
Under this policy instrument, energy suppliers have to generate a given amount of energy efficiency measures, in a quantity w.e proportional to the quantity of energy they sell, e. To fulfil this obligation, we assume that they can only subsidise energy-saving goods and services g. For each unit of g they subsidise, they get one white certificate. We assume that firms comply with this obligation, so the quantity of white certificates equals the aggregate target. Since we model only one type of energy-saving goods and services, it is impossible to distinguish business-asusual purchase of g from additional energy efficiency measures 4 . We thus assume that every sale of g is subsidised.
A new equation appears, the energy-efficiency constraint put by public authorities on energy suppliers:
We assume that this constraint is binding. Otherwise, the price of white certificates would drop to zero and the policy would have no effect at all.
Neither consumers nor suppliers of composite goods are directly affected; hence the first twelve equations do not change. Equations (17-18) do not change either.
Equations (13) to (16) 
. e w e s e P P w e
where P w is the price of a white certificate.
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and two more variables: P W and w.
White certificates with an absolute target (WC A )
The only difference with WC % is that energy suppliers now have to deliver white certificates in a fixed quantity W meaning that each producer's target is defined independently of this producer's current and future decisions 5 . The target may for instance be proportional to the historical output of each producer -but not to its current output, otherwise we are back to WC % .
We will see in section 3 that this distinction has important consequences. The equilibrium on the white certificates market becomes:
where W is the energy producer's target.
Here again, neither consumers nor suppliers of composite goods are not directly affected, hence neither the first twelve equations nor equations (17-18) change.
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and two more variables: P W and W.
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Tax rebated lump-sum to consumers (T H ) 6
Under this policy instrument, energy produced is taxed at a rate t and receipts from the tax are given lump-sum to consumers. A new equation describes the public budget balance:
where LS is the lump-sum subsidy received by the representative consumer.
Compared to the initial model, equations (13), (14) and (18) 
TC CC LS
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and two more variables: t and LS.
Tax rebated lump-sum to energy suppliers (T E )

8
The only difference with the previous policy instrument is that the receipts from the tax are now rebated (lump-sum) to energy suppliers and not to consumers. Again, a new equation describes the public budget balance:
Compared to the initial model, only equations (13) and (14) 
Subsidy on energy-efficient goods and services
Under this policy instrument, the production of g is subsidised at a rate s and the cost of the subsidy is covered by a lump-sum tax on consumers. A new equation describes the public budget balance:
where LS is the lump-sum tax paid by the representative consumer.
Compared to the initial model, equations (15), (16) and (18) are modified as below:
TC CC LS
Compared to the initial model, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and two more variables: s and LS.
Energy-efficiency regulation (R)
Consumers still minimise their cost according to equations (1-4) but now subject to a new constraint:
ES r e ≥ (19 R )
Which we assume binding. This is a classical and straightforward way of modelling energy efficiency regulation; cf. Wirl (1989) 9 .
Assuming that both constraints (4) and (19 R ) are binding, equations (7) and (8) become:
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Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one less variable (e), one more variable (r) and the same number of equations.
Numerical results
For each policy instrument, we solve the model for a given level of energy consumption. We choose an energy-saving target of 2% compared to business-as-usual, a figure in line with the existing TWC schemes (cf. section 1 above). It turns out that the evolution of every variable is monotonous with the energy-saving target so contrarily to Quirion (2005) 
Total costs and quantities
The first row of Figure 3 displays the increase in total cost compared to the business-as-usual equilibrium (note that the scale of the y-axis for TC is logarithmic). It turns out that for 0 a σ = every policy instrument entails the same overall cost. However as soon as 0 a σ > the two taxes entail the lowest overall cost, followed by WC % and R, whereas WC A and S entail the highest cost. The explanation is the following. To reach a given level of energy savings at the lowest aggregate cost, it is optimal both to substitute g to e, i.e., to increase energy efficiency, and to reduce the level of energy service ES, i.e., to progress towards sufficiency 11 . As is apparent from the second row of Figure 3 , all instruments lead to substitute g for e, but (third row) only the taxes lead to a decrease in ES. The other instruments induce an increase in ES, either moderate (WC % , R) or significant (WC A , S) 12 . In other terms, they generate a rebound effect: a part of the 15 of 29 increase in energy efficiency (SE/e) is "lost" because of an increase in ES. To compensate for this rebound effect, the substitution of g for e has to be higher, especially for WC A and S. The lower row of Figure 3 presents the rebound ratio, defined as
ES ES ES ES
e e Δ Δ −Δ . This ratio indicates the share of energy savings that is "lost" because of the increase in ES (if any). As the value of a σ tends towards that of b σ , this ratio also tends to 100% with S or WC A whereas it only tends to 10% with R or WC % .
Quantitatively, the difference in total cost across instruments is massive. sum allocation lead to the optimal production, at least in a closed economy with perfect competition (Quirion, 2007) . 
Consumers' prices
As indicated by the first row of figure 4 , the evolution of the consumers' energy price is much contrasted: it goes down with WC A , S and R; and up with T E , T H and WC % , more sharply with taxes than with WC % . These evolutions may be explained as follows. Under all policy 17 of 29 instruments, the decrease in energy consumption makes the energy price go downward, since the energy supply curve is upward-slopping. Under WC A , S and R, this is the only influence on energy price. However, under both taxes, the energy price rises since suppliers pass the tax on to consumers. The same stands under WC % : since suppliers must generate more certificates if they increase their production, the certificates' cost is a part of their marginal cost (cf. eq. 14 WC% above), hence of energy price. However the rise in energy price is lower under WC % than under the taxes because under the former, substitution of g for e from two channels: the decrease in P g and the rise in P e , thus for a given level of energy saving, the evolution of each of these prices may be lower than if only one channel was used.
WC % and WC A have a contrasted impact on P e : under WC A , since every supplier's target is exogenous, the suppliers do not include the certificates' cost in their marginal cost (cf. eq. 14 WCA above 13 ). This distinction has important distributional and efficiency consequences. In particular, since WC A decreases P g without raising P e , P ES decreases so ES increases; this rebound effect explains why WC A is so costly (cf. section 3.1 above).
Of course, the higher b σ , i.e., the more substitutable e and g, the lower the increase in P e necessary to get a given level of energy savings under T E , T H and WC % . Also, the higher a σ , i.e., the more substitutable ES and c, the lower the increase in P e necessary to get a given level of energy savings under T E and T H . Yet the opposite is true for WC % , because the higher a σ , the higher the rebound effect.
The second row of figure 4 displays the impact on P g , the consumers' price of g. It rises with R, T F and T H because the supply curve is upward-slopping and demand for g rises. Under S, WC A and WC % , it goes down since this good is subsidised, but less so under WC % because in this case, as we have just seen, a part of the energy savings comes from the increase in P e . Of course, for S, WC A and WC % , the higher b σ , the lower the decrease in P g necessary to get a given level of energy savings. However, the higher a σ , the higher the decrease in P g necessary, because in this case the rebound effect is higher.
The price-index of the energy service P ES (not shown here) is a combination of P e and P g hence it stems from the above-mentioned evolutions. It increases under the two taxes, decreases sharply under WC A and S and is slightly reduced under WC % and R. Finally P c (not shown here)
18 of 29 is almost unaffected; it increases slightly under the taxes because consumers substitute c for ES and the supply curve is upward slopping; and vice-versa for WC A and S. 
Distributional consequences
The upper-left panel of figure 5 displays energy suppliers' profit, which drops in the same proportion with all policy instruments except WC A and T E . Under WC A , it decreases much more since energy suppliers pay the cost of white certificates while, as already explained, they do not pass this cost on to consumers, due to the lump-sum nature of their targets. Note that for a low b σ or a high a σ , profit can become negative: suppliers still make some money by selling energy but this not enough to pay the cost of white certificates 14 . Under T E , it rises since the energy price increases despite energy suppliers receiving a rebate: since this rebate is lump-sum, it does not influence their pricing behaviour, based on marginal cost. Energy suppliers thus benefit from a windfall profit under this policy instrument, as they do under the EU ETS (Sijm et al., 2006) .
The profit of energy-saving goods and service (g) producers' rises with every instrument. The increase is identical for 0 a σ ≈ , otherwise it is proportional to the rise in demand for g, i.e., higher for WC A and S and lower for the taxes.
The profit of composite goods (c) producers also evolves proportionally to the demand for c, but with much more moderate changes.
The last row of Figure 5 displays the cost for consumers CC, which is the cost of purchasing the goods allowing a utility from consumption U plus LS with S (since the subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax on households) or minus LS with T H (since the receipts from the tax on energy are σ is high enough, but otherwise the cost to consumers is relatively high. These are also the parameters for which S entails the highest total cost; in this case, a very high subsidy rate has to be paid, hence consumers have to pay a very high lump-sum tax. 
Discussion
Where to apply which policy instrument?
We have seen that the relative cost of policy instruments depends crucially on the value of a σ . If this value is close to zero, there is little rebound effect and every instrument entails the same overall cost, but if it is high, there is a large rebound and taxes are much more cost-efficient than WC % and R and even more so than WC A and S. Many empirical estimates of the rebound effect have been published. Greening et al., 2000 performed a review of over 75 estimates and conclude that no significant rebound exist for white appliances, and only a limited one for residential lighting. The cost penalty (compared to taxes) associated with WC % or R is thus probably limited for these applications. On the opposite a larger rebound seems to exist for automobile transport, space cooling, space heating and water heating, hence the cost difference between taxes and the other policy instruments should be higher.
Equity and political acceptability
Although the taxes entail the lowest aggregate cost, they may be politically more difficult to implement economists than other instruments because they lead to a higher (and highly visible) increase in energy price. WC A causes a significant drop in energy suppliers' profit so the latter are likely to lobby against this instrument.
21 of 29 WC % , R and S have politically the advantage of transferring a part of the cost on the producers of the composite good, a heterogeneous group unlikely to engage in the policy process on such an issue since energy is not a part of their business and since they are only marginally affected.
In addition, they increase g π significantly (10% at least), so producers of energy-saving goods and services may form an influent lobby group in favour of such policies. This may explain why regulations and subsidies form the bulk of energy-saving policy instruments in the real world and why many countries have launched, or are considering 15 , a TWC Scheme. 
Issues not included in the model
The "energy-efficiency gap"
The "energy-efficiency gap" refers to the fact that many opportunities to save energy are not implemented by consumers although the decrease in fuel cost would outweigh the cost of the energy efficiency investment according to standard cost-benefit analysis 16 . This raises some doubts on the efficiency of energy taxes: if consumers take little account of energy price in their behaviour, raising this price is unlikely to cut energy consumption sharply. On the opposite, 15 According to EuroWhiteCert (2007) Denmark and the Netherlands consider implementing such a system. 16 In the model we assume that economic agents (in particular energy suppliers and consumers) are perfectly rational and that the information provided is perfect. As a consequence, we rule out the energy-efficiency gap, while this gap may be seen as one of the main reasons for implementing energy-efficiency policies. Yet various economic mechanisms may explain it and no theoretical model can represent all of them. Hence, choosing a model featuring one of the economic mechanisms behind the energy-efficiency gap appears certainly desirable, but only as a second step, once results from a more canonical model with perfect rationality and information are available. Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, and Sorrell et al., 2004 ). We will not restate them here but simply stress that TWC schemes may help alleviating some (but not all) of them. Indeed several explanations of the energy-efficiency gap point out that some consumers give more importance to investment costs than to energy costs, for various reasons: limited access to credit due to asymmetric information by lenders on the credit market, split incentives to save energy, e.g., in collective housing or commercial centres, rigid separation between investment and operating budget in organisations… By reducing the cost of energy-efficient capital goods for the consumers, TWC schemes may thus help mobilising a part of the energy-efficiency gap more easily than taxes. However this intuition should be checked in a formal model featuring some factors which explain the energyefficiency gap, including those mentioned above. We leave this for future research.
Transaction costs
In the case of TWC schemes, more precisely of the British EEC, Mundaca (2007) identified and quantified transaction costs through a questionnaire distributed to energy suppliers and through interviews. He found out that transaction costs include search for information, persuasion of customers, negotiation with business partners, measurement and verification activities and due accreditation of savings. Mundaca estimated that transaction costs represented 8% to 12% of investment costs for lighting measures and 24% to 36% for insulation measures.
These figures are quite significant and most likely higher than transaction costs that could be generated with taxes or regulations.
Conclusion
Although simple and transparent, our partial equilibrium model allows us to compare in a single framework tradable white certificate schemes with the main existing policy instruments for energy efficiency: energy taxes, subsidies on energy-saving goods and regulations setting a minimum level of energy efficiency. We highlight the importance of the rebound effect and more generally of the impact of the policy instruments on the consumption of energy service. We provide three major conclusions.
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First, if a tradable white certificate scheme is to be implemented, a generally neglected but important issue is whether the energy-efficiency target imposed to every energy supplier is in proportion of the current quantity of energy sold by this firm or whether this target is disconnected from the firm's current decisions. We argue for the former option, which reduces the distributive impact of the policy, the rebound effect and the overall cost.
Second, a tradable white certificate scheme (with targets in proportion of the current quantity of energy sold by this firm) entails a higher overall cost than an energy tax but less than a subsidy on energy-saving goods. The difference in cost among policy instruments is low for energy services with a low elasticity of demand, such as white appliances, but may be high for energy services with a higher elasticity of demand, such as automobile transportation, space heating, water heating or space cooling.
Third, a tradable white certificate scheme (with the above precision) may be politically easier to implement than an energy tax because it entails little wealth transfers.
We also discuss informally some mechanisms not included in our models. Firstly, compared to rigid standards, a TWC scheme has the advantage of equalising the marginal cost of energy saving, but generate more transaction costs. Secondly, compared to taxes, they also generate more transaction costs but they are probably more able to address the energy-efficiency gap. 
Appendix 1. List of variables and parameters
Appendix 2. Comparison of national targets
We compare national targets by formulating them in the same way: in TWh of final energy savings, cumulated over the measures lifetime and discounted. This is actually the way the British and French targets are formulated (with close discount rates of respectively 3.5% and 4%). The difficulty is thus to convert into this way the Italian target, originally formulated in ton of oil equivalent (toe) of primary energy.
For that purpose, we interpret the Italian target as follows (Pavan, 2005) : The undiscounted cumulated savings are the area under the curve, which is equal to five times the amount of savings in year 2009 (2.9 Mtoe). Since we use a 4% discount rate, the multiplying factor is not 5 but actually 4.63. Since this figure is in primary energy, we multiply it by 0.8 17 to
convert it in final energy and by 11.63 to convert it in TWh.
We thus have: 2.9 * 4.63 * 0.8 * 11.63 = 125 TWh.
We then divide every national absolute target by the scheme's length and formulate them in "annual TWh". This unit has no physical meaning but allows us to compare the absolute constraint levels in a standardised way. Eventually we compare these amounts to the national final energy consumption in order to have an idea of the relative constraint of each scheme, using the IEA statistics of year 2005. 
